In this paper, we analyze the anti-eavesdropping and anti-jamming performance of D2D communications with a full-duplex active eavesdropper (FAE). We consider the scenario that when the FAE intrudes the D2D underlaying cellular networks, it can passively wiretap confidential messages in D2D communications and actively jam all legitimate links. A hierarchical and heterogeneous power control mechanism with multiple D2D user equipments (DUEs) and one cellular user equipment (CUE) is proposed to combat the intelligent FAE. Moreover, a multi-tier Stackelberg game is formulated to model the complex interaction among them and the existence of Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) is proved. The best response (BR)-based hierarchical power control algorithm with perfect information and a robust learning method with imperfect information are proposed to obtain SE. The numerical results illustrate the convergence of the two proposed hierarchical power control algorithms, which are also compared with the random selection algorithm (RSA).
I. INTRODUCTION
D2D communications are the direct communications between cellular user equipments (CUEs) in close proximity without the retransmission of the base statation (BS). Due to the open property of wireless channels and the access of D2D user equipments (DUEs), physical layer security of D2D underlaying cellular networks has drawn more and more attention in recent years [1] - [8] . In the majority of researches, DUEs were regarded as friendly jammers to improve the secrecy capacity of CUEs [1] - [5] . However, few works focused on the physical layer secrecy performance of DUEs or the secrecy throughout of the D2D underlaying cellular networks [6] - [8] . Compared with the cellular communication mode, D2D communication mode is fragile to be eavesdropped and jammed [9] , hence the confidentiality and reliability of D2D communications are difficult to be guaranteed.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Li Wang. In the researches with respect to physical layer security of D2D underlaying cellular networks, the vicious attackers were supposed to be passive eavesdroppers, who kept in silence in the whole course of wiretapping. Few works considered the scenario that there existed more intelligent attackers, such as the probabilistic passive eavesdroppers [10] or the selective passive eavesdropper [11] .These kinds of eavesdroppers can wiretap legitimate users with a probability or selectively wiretap CUEs or DUEs, to enhance the destruction through increasing the attacking uncertainty. In addition, the physical layer security problems with active eavesdroppers in wireless networks have got more and more attention in recently years [12] - [14] . Active eavesdroppers have the ability to change attacking modes, i.e., swithing attacking modes between passive eavesdropping and active jamming in half-duplex way, or launching two attacking modes simultaneously in full-duplex way. The flexible attacking method brings much more destruction to wireless networks than passive eavesdropping.
If full-duplex active eavesdroppers (FAEs) intrude into the D2D underlaying cellular networks, there mainly exist the following challenges to improve the anti-eavesdropping and anti-jamming performance of D2D communications:
• Joint anti-eavesdropping and anti-jamming requirements of legitimate users. FAEs can launch attacking modes of passive eavesdropping and active jamming simultaneously, not only physical layer security performance, but also transmission reliability of legitimate users should be jointly considered.
• Influence of internal interference and external jamming. We should consider the interference between CUEs and DUEs in the cellular networks and the external jamming from FAEs to legitimate users in a uniform frame. Furthermore, the influence is coupled and hard to be solved.
• As eavesdroppers becoming more intelligent and active, strategy optimization of FAEs should also be considered. Moreover, the purpose of FAEs, CUEs and DUEs are totally different. It is challenging to find the equilibrium strategy for them, e.g., DUEs want to maximize their achievable secrecy rates, CUEs want to maximize their transmission rates, while FAEs want to maximize the destruction to cellular networks. Therefore, it is meaningful to improve the antieavesdropping and anti-jamming performance of D2D underlaying cellular networks with full-duplex active eavesdroppers. However, as far as we known, there were few works studying the interactions among CUEs, DUEs and FAEs with different purpose in a uniform frame. It is suitable to employ Stackelberg game [15] , [16] to model the coupled and competitive relationship among DUEs, CUEs and FAEs. For example, using the Stackelberg game framework [17] - [19] between CUEs and DUEs, secrecy problems based on channel allocation, power control and node selection were studied under passively eavesdropped. The confronting relationship between legitimate users and active eavesdroppers were also modeled by the Stackelberg game in [20] , [21] . The two-tier game between CUEs and DUEs, or between legitimate users and active eavesdroppers have been investigated in many studies.
While in this paper, we formulate a three-tier Stackelberg game [22] , in which multiple DUEs work as leaders in the first tier, CUE works as vice leader in the second tier and FAE works as follower in the third tier. Since discrete power control was practically applied in current communication systems such as 3GPP LTE networks, the hierarchical discrete power control mechanism is adopted under the proposed multi-tier Stackelberg game. Then the existence of Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) is proved. Two hierarchical and heterogeneous discrete power control algorithms are proposed to obtain SE under perfect and imperfect information. The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We consider the hierarchical power control mechanism to improve the anti-eavesdropping and anti-jamming performance of D2D underlaying cellular networks with full-duplex active eavesdroppers. The cooperative relationship between multiple DUEs and a CUE, and the confronting relationship between legitimate users and a FAE are considered under the uniform framework, in which all intelligent players have ''skin in the game''.
• A multi-tier Stackelberg game is formulated among DUEs, CUE and FAE. The non-cooperative subgame among DUEs in the first tier is modeled as an exact potential game, which is proved to have at least one pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE). Through backward induction, we can obtain SE of the proposed multitier Stackelberg game.
• Two hierarchical and heterogeneous power control algorithms with perfect and imperfect information are proposed to obtain SE. Simulation results indicate that the two proposed power control algorithms both outperform the random selection algorithm (RSA). The rest sections of this paper are organized as follows. The related works are stated in section II. The system model and problem formulation is followed in section III. Then a hierarchical power control game is proposed and the existence of SE is proved in section IV. In section V, two hierarchical and heterogeneous power control algorithms are designed, and the convergence of the proposed algorithms is discussed. The numerical results are presented and analyzed in section VI. Finally, the conclusion is drawn in section VII.
II. RELATED WORK A. PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY IN D2D COMMUNICATIONS
With the quick deployment of 5G mobile communication system, D2D communication, as a key technology, becomes a research focus in recent years. Due to the access of D2D communication, the physical layer security problem in the cellular networks becomes more and more complex. On the one hand, inner compromised nodes can wiretap CUEs or DUEs. On the other hand, outer malicious nodes can also wiretap legitimate users. Hence, the eavesdropping attackers in D2D underlaying cellular networks can be divided into two types: inner eavesdroppers and outer eavesdroppers. Inner eavesdroppers are doubtful CUEs or DUEs who wiretap confidential information, and decrease achievable secrecy rates of legitimate users. For example, the compromised CUEs who wiretapped D2D communications in [25] , and DUEs who wiretapped secret information transmitted from the BS to CUEs in [26] , belong to inner eavesdroppers.
Whereas outer eavesdroppers were more general, most works studied the cooperation between CUEs and DUEs to combat them [1] - [7] . In the majority of these works, DUEs were always regarded as friendly jammers to enhance the secrecy capacity of CUEs [1] - [5] . There were a few works focusing on improving the secrecy throughout of D2D underlaying cellular networks [6] , [7] under transmission rate constraints. Few works focused on reliable and secure D2D communications, with the help of outer nodes [27] or the artificial noise transmitted by the BS [18] , [19] to improve the achievable secrecy rate of DUEs. It is worth noting that the eavesdroppers in above works didn't change attacking strategies during their attacking process. Few works considered that there were eavesdroppers with some intelligence, such as the probabilistic passive eavesdroppers [10] or the selective passive eavesdropper [11] , who wiretapped legitimate users with a probability or selectively wiretapped CUEs or DUEs. Even so, the eavesdroppers mentioned above were totally passive.
The main difference between our paper and the above works are that eavesdroppers investigated are full-duplex active eavesdroppers, who can launch eavesdropping and jamming simultaneously. Suppose that active eavesdroppers are only interested in wiretapping confidential information of DUEs, whereas they are willing to jam all legitimate links. So we need to consider not only the anti-eavesdropping demand of DUEs, but also the anti-jamming demand of all legitimate users simultaneously. Intelligent active eavesdroppers may change attacking strategies adaptively, and the strategy alteration is not necessarily to be perfectly observed due to the antagonistic relationship between legitimate users and active eavesdroppers. Hence, it is more difficult for legitimate users to combat them.
B. PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY WITH ACTIVE EAVESDROPPERS
Physical layer security problems were usually studied under the threat of passive eavesdroppers. In recently years, some works studied how active eavesdroppers destroy the secure and reliable communications of wireless networks [12] - [14] , [20] , [21] , [23] , [24] . The occurrence of active eavesdroppers makes the external attacking modes change from eavesdropping only to joint eavesdropping and jamming. According to the duplex mode, active eavesdroppers can be divided into half-duplex active eavesdroppers and full-duplex ones. The half-duplex active eavesdroppers need to select one of the attacking modes in a certain time while the full-duplex active eavesdroppers can launch the two attacking modes at the same time. In most works, the confronting interactions between legitimate users and active eavesdroppers were considered. For half-duplex active eavesdroppers, their alternative strategies are eavesdropping or jamming attack modes [21] , [28] . While for full-duplex active eavesdroppers, they can modify their jamming power [20] , resource allocation [12] or antenna allocation [13] , [14] to maximize the destruction to legitimate users. For legitimate users, they can improve the physical layer security performance through protocol design [23] , [24] , power allocation [21] and other technologies.
In this paper, we introduce the full-duplex active eavesdropping mode into D2D communications, not only considering the confronting relationship between legitimate users and FAEs, but also investigating different interests of CUEs and DUEs to combat FAEs in an uniform framework.
C. GAME THEORY FOR PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY IN D2D COMMUNICATIONS WITH ACTIVE EAVESDROPPERS
Game theory is an efficient mathematical tool, which can model the interaction between multiple players with different interests. Not only the cooperative relationship between DUEs and CUEs, but also the confronting relationship between legitimate users and FAEs, can be modeled by different game frameworks. Under the coalition formation game framework, the energy efficiency was optimized by spectrum resource allocation between CUEs and DUEs in [26] . Stackelberg game was employed to model the interaction between the BS and DUEs to improve the achievable secrecy rate and optimize the social welfare in [18] , [19] . From the active eavesdropper's point of view, the authors in [20] solved the wiretapping rate optimization problem under the hierarchical game framework, and analyzed the effects of partial information and self-interference on the utilities of both sides. In [21] , the interaction between the legitimate transmitter and the active eavesdropper was modeled as a two-person zero-sum game, and corresponding equilibriums were discussed based on the strategic form and extensive form of the proposed game. However, the complex interaction among all agents in the system has not been studied in a uniform game framework.
So in this paper, we consider the attacking strategy optimization while investigating the physical layer security of D2D communications, and formulate a multi-tier Stackelberg game to model the complex interactions among DUEs, CUE and FAE. Under the hierarchical game framework, the sum achievable secrecy rate of DUEs, the transmission rate of the CUE and the utility of the FAE are considered. Furthermore, the changing strategies of active eavesdroppers make the closed-form solutions of legitimate users more difficult. Machine learning [29] - [33] is employed to solve this kind of problem. Therefore in this paper, we consider that legitimate users can modify their strategies through learning from the dynamic environment and the strategy variation of attackers. Then, they can finally obtain an optimal anti-eavesdropping and anti-jamming performance.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper, we consider a cell in D2D underlaying cellular networks, which is shown in Fig. 1 . The BS is on the center of the cell, with a CUE, a FAE and N DUEs locating randomly in the cell, which are denoted as B, C, A, N = {1, 2, . . . , N }, respectively. Suppose that all legitimate users work in halfduplex way, and DUEs deliver private messages directly by reusing the cellular uplink from CUE to BS in the underlaying way. FAE works in full-duplex way, and it wiretaps private messages of DUEs passively and jams all legitimate links actively at the same time. Since the jamming signal cannot be perfectly cancelled by FAE due to its hardware limits, the residual self-interference is considered and the linear self-interference factor is denoted as α. Furthermore, suppose that the global channel state information (CSI) is available. Since CUE and DUEs can interchange CSI, and the jamming actions of FAE can be caught and monitored [34] . The transmission power of node x is denoted as P x , where x ∈ {C, A, N }. The channel gain between node x and y is denoted as h xy , where y ∈ {B, C, A, N }. Specially, h ii denotes the channel gain of the ith D2D pair and h AA denotes the selfinterference channel gain of FAE. The notations used in this paper are summarized in Table 1 .
We focus on the physical layer security of D2D communications and the transmission capacity of the CUE. According to the above assumptions, the transmission rate of the ith DUE and the eavesdropping rate of FAE for it are written as:
where N 0 is the background noise.
The achievable secrecy rate of the ith DUE can be expressed as:
Considering power consumption costs of DUEs and the interference they bring to the CUE, we design the utility of the ith DUE as follows:
where c D is the unit power consumption cost of DUEs, and β is the unit interference cost. The first item of the above formula is the sum achievable secrecy rate of all DUEs, the second item is the interference cost that the ith DUE brings to the cellular link, and the third item is its individual power consumption cost. Then the transmission rate of CUE under internal interference and external jamming can be expressed as:
Considering the power consumption cost and the interference compensation that DUEs pay to it, the utility of the CUE can be written as:
While the objective of the FAE is on the opposite of legitimate users, it wants to minimize the sum achievable secrecy rate of all DUEs and transmission rate of CUE, and the jamming cost should also be considered. Hence, the utility of the FAE is designed as follows:
where c A is the jamming cost of FAE. VOLUME 7, 2019 In this paper, we suppose that all agents want to optimize their own utilities by modifying their discrete transmission power, and the power strategies are made in a sequential order. Firstly, all DUEs make their transmission power strategies with the purpose to maximize the tradeoff among sum achievable secrecy rate, individual power consumption and interference compensation costs. Then CUE makes its power strategy with the purpose to maximize the tradeoff between its transmission rate and power consumption. Finally, the FAE through observing the power strategies of DUEs and the CUE, determine its jamming power to maximize the destruction to the cellular network. Through the above analysis, the optimization problem of this paper can be expressed as:
where i ∈ N , P i max , P C max , P A max are the maximal transmission power of the ith DUE, CUE and FAE. And P * C and P * A are optimal transmission power of CUE and FAE.
IV. MULTI-TIER STACKELBERG GAME FORMULATION AND EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
According to the analysis of the related work, we find that Stackelberg game is suitable to model the relationship among multiple players who make their decisions sequentially. For example, in [19] , two Stackelberg game were proposed to model the hierarchical interaction between the D2D transmitter and the BS, in which the D2D transmitter worked as the leader, and BS worked as the follower to optimize the achievable secrecy throughput of DUEs and the service profit of the BS. In [17] , a Stackelberg game was proposed to model hierarchical power allocation between a D2D pair and multiple CUEs, in which the D2D pair worked as the leader, CUEs worked as followers to optimize the transmission rate of the DUE and the secrecy rates of CUEs sequentially. Therefore, considering the strategy variation of FAE in the D2D underlaying cellular networks, we apply a multi-tier Stackelberg game to formulate the hierarchical power control problem in D2D underlaying cellular networks with a FAE. The game is denoted as G = {{N , C, A}, {P N , P C , P A }, {U N , U C , U A }}. Suppose that the transmission power set of the ith DUE is denoted as P N = {P i1 , . . . , P il , . . . , P iL }, where i ∈ N . The transmission power set of the CUE and the jamming power set of the FAE are denoted as P C = {P C1 , . . . , P Cm , . . . , P CM } and P A = {P A1 , . . . , P Aj , . . . , P AJ }, respectively, and the utilities of them are as shown in formula (4), (6) and (7). As players of the proposed hierarchical power control game, DUEs work as leaders, CUE works as the vice leader and FAE works as the follower of the game. All players in the game aim at maximizing respective utilities with the optimal discrete transmission power. The diagram of the proposed multi-tier hierarchical power control game framework is presented in Fig. 2 . Firstly, DUEs who work as leaders in the first tier, decide their discrete power strategies. Then, CUE, who works as the vice leader in the second tier, decides its discrete power strategy accoring the leaders' decisions. Finally, FAE, who works as the follower in the third tier, selects its jamming power to maximize its utility after observing strategy selections of legitimate users.
In order to find the solution of the multi-tier hierarchical power control game, we adopt the backward induction method to obtain SE. Firstly, in the third tier, FAE decides its jamming power strategy after given transmission power of DUEs and CUE to maximize its utility, then CUE optimizes its power strategy to maximize its utility. Finally, all DUEs in the first tier make their power strategies to maximize their utilities. For FAE and CUE in the two lower tiers of the proposed multi-tier hierarchical power control game, optimal power strategies can always be found in their discrete power sets. Hence, the existence of SE depends on the existence of NE of the sub-game in the first tier.
Definition 1: The Nash equilibrium (NE) of the noncooperative sub-game among DUEs in the first tier is a power profile (P * 1 , . . . , P * i , . . . , P * N ) which satisfies the following formula [35] :
It means that no DUE can acquire utility improvement via deviating the above stationary state unilaterally. For the purpose of analyzing the non-cooperative sub-game among DUEs and proving the existence of NE, the notation of the exact potential game is introduced.
Definition 2: A game is called exact potential game, if there is a potential function Φ(a i , a −i ) satisfying the formula as follows [36] :
where a −i represents strategy selections of other players except the ith player.
Theorem 1: There exists at least one pure-strategy NE of the non-cooperative sub-game in the first tier.
Proof: We design the potential function as the tradeoff among the sum achievable secrecy rate, the sum power consumption and interference compensation costs of DUEs, which is denoted as:
Since the following equation is satisfied:
Hence, the non-cooperative sub-game among DUEs is an exact potential game. According to [37] , we can see that there exists at least one pure-strategy NE of the non-cooperative sub-game in the first tier.
Definition 3: The Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) of the proposed hierarchical power control game is a power profile (P * N , P * C , P * A ) which satisfies the following formula:
Theorem 2: There exists at least one SE in the proposed hierarchical power control game.
Proof: Firstly, after observing power strategies of all DUEs in the first tier and CUE in the second tier, the FAE searches its discrete power set and obtains the optimal jamming power. Based on backward induction, the CUE receives strategy selections of all DUEs, and learns the jamming power strategy of the FAE to make its optimal transmission power decision in the second tier. Finally, in the first tier, through observing of the jamming power of FAE, receiving the feedback of CUE, DUEs can make their transmission power strategies. Given the optimal transmission power of CUE and jamming power of FAE, we can find that there is at least one pure-strategy NE in the non-cooperative subgame among DUEs based on the above analysis, so there is at least one SE in the proposed hierarchical power control game [38] .
V. HIERARCHICAL AND HETEROGENEOUS POWER CONTROL ALGORITHMS
We have proved that there exists at least one SE in the proposed hierarchical power control game. To achieve the solution of the proposed multi-tier hierarchical power control game, we propose two hierarchical learning algorithms with perfect or imperfect information respectively in this section. If all users in cellular networks are with perfect information of each other, after users in the two lower tiers optimizing their power strategies, DUEs in the first tier decide their power strategies based on the best response (BR) algorithm [36] , [37] , which can converge to the NE of the exact potential game, and finally the SE can be achieved. We also consider the worst case that only FAE has the perfect information of legitimate users, while legitimate users have to make their power strategies with imperfect information. In this situation, we propose a hierarchical and heterogeneous learning frame, in which CUE applies Q-learning [39] algorithm and DUEs appeal the stochastic learning automata [40] algorithm to converge the stationary solution under the uncertain and dynamic environment. The diagram of the proposed two hierarchical learning algorithms is shown in Fig. 3 , and we describe the two hierarchical learning algorithms detailedly in the following subsections.
A. THE BR-BASED HIERARCHICAL POWER CONTROL ALGORITHM WITH PERFECT INFORMATION
According to the above analysis of NE, we find that after the lower tiers obtaining their optimal power strategies, every DUE in the first tier can optimize its power strategy with other DUEs keeping unchanged. Therefore, under perfect information, FAE in the third tier determines its optimal jamming power firstly, then CUE in the second tier makes its optimal VOLUME 7, 2019 power strategy decision, finally in the first tier, DUEs apply the BR based algorithm to find the NE of non-cooperative sub-game, and the SE is achieved. The detail of the BR-based hierarchical power control algorithm (BHPCA) is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1
The BR-Based Hierarchical Power Control Algorithm with Perfect Information (BHPCA) 1: Initialization:
(1) DUEs and CUE randomly select power levels from their discrete power sets. 2: Iteration:
(1) t = t + 1.
(2) FAE selects the optimal jamming power P * A (t) given the strategies of DUEs and CUE. (3) CUE selects the optimal transmission power P * C (t) after observing the decision-making of FAE. (4) A DUE is randomly selected and power levels of other DUEs are maintained unchanged, then the power strategy of the selected DUE is updated as follows: (
Theorem 3:
The Algorithm 1 converges to SE of the proposed Stackelberg game with perfect information.
Proof: Suppose that all users in the hierarchical game framework possess the perfect information in common, based on backward induction, in every slot, FAE and CUE in the two lower tiers can obtain their optimal power strategies as follows:
After that, every DUE in the first tier decides its power strategy with other DUEs' strategies keeping unchanged, which is shown as follows:
Since the best response algorithm can find the NE of the exact potential game, after the optimal power strategies P * A (t) and P * C (t) of the two lower tiers being obtained, it always converges to the NE P * N (t) of the first tier, so finally the SE P * N (t max ), P * C (t max ), P * A (t max ) is achieved.
B. THE HIERARCHICAL AND HETEROGENEOUS POWER CONTROL ALGORITHM WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION
Under the perfect information condition, we can use the BR-based algorithm to find SE of the proposed hierarchical power control game. Then in this subsection, we consider the worst case that only FAE has the perfect information of CUE and DUEs, but legitimate users just know partial information of FAE. Hence FAE can make optimal power strategy given the perfect information of legitimate users, while legitimate users only get their power strategies through interacting with FAE and learning from the dynamic environment. Machine learning is a powerful tool to address the decision-making problem in the dynamical and uncertain environment. Q-learning [39] is an effective learning method to obtain an optimal utility in single-agent case based on a Q function without the full knowledge of the environment. And the stochastic learning automata (SLA) can converge to the pure-strategy NE of the exact potential game via iterating in mixed-strategic forms under the dynamic and uncertain conditions [40] . Therefore, we propose a hierarchical and heterogeneous power control algorithm based on Q-learning and SLA to acquire SE of the proposed game. Suppose that the mixed strategy of CUE at slot k is denoted as p Cm (k), which is the probability that CUE selects the power level in the power level set M = {1, 2, . . . , M }, and
The mixed strategy of the ith DUE at epoch t is p i (t) = (p i1 (t), . . . , p il (t), . . . , p iL (t)), which is the probability profile that the ith DUE selects the lth power level in the power level set of L = {1, 2, . . . , L}, and
the mixed strategies of all DUEs are denoted as p(t) = (p 1 (t), . . . , p i (t), . . . , p N (t)). And the action profile of DUEs at epoch t is denoted as a(t) = (a 1 (t), . . . , a i (t), . . . , a N (t)).
In the proposed hierarchical and heterogeneous power control algorithm, CUE and DUEs update their mixed strategies in different time scales based on heterogeneous learning algorithms. After FAE makes its optimal jamming power strategy, CUE updates its Q value and mixed strategy at the kth slot according to the following rule:
where κ k C is the learning rate of CUE, and τ C denotes the tradeoff of exploration-exploitation. Then after the CUE has acquired its final power strategy during inner iterations, DUEs update their power strategies at tth epoch according to: (1) t = t + 1.
(2) Every DUE selects its power strategy according its strategy selection probability p il (t).
3: Inner iteration:
(b) CUE selects its power strategy according its strategy selection probability p Cm (k). (c) FAE selects the optimal jamming power given the strategies of DUEs and CUE, which is shown as follows:
(e) CUE updates its Q value and strategy selection probability according to formula (20) and (21) . End inner iteration. (3) Every DUE measures its utility U i (t). (4) Every DUE updates its strategy selection probability p il (t) according to formula (22) and (23) . End outer iteration. 4 : Output:
(
Theorem 4:
The Algorithm 2 converges to SE of the proposed Stackelberg game with imperfect information.
Proof: Based on backward induction, firstly, FAE in the third tier of the proposed game makes its optimal jamming power strategy P * A with perfect information of legitimate users. Secondly, CUE in the second tier measures its utility with the feedback of SINR from BS and exchange of interference compensation between DUEs, then updates its Q value and mixed strategy according to formula (20) and (21) . Based on [41] , [42] , as κ k C is approaching to 0, CUE tends to select the optimal power strategy P * C with the maximum Q value. Thirdly, DUEs in the first tier modify their power strategies based on SLA, and can converge to the pure-strategy NE of the non-cooperative sub-game when the learning rate is approaching to 0 based on [40] , [41] , [43] . Hence, the Stackelberg equilibrium (P * N , P * C , P * A ) can be finally acquired under dynamic and uncertain environment based on the proposed algorithm.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we perform some numerical results and average performance to present the convergent behaviors of the proposed algorithms. We let the position of the BS is on the origin of coordinates, the coordinates of CUE and FAE are (200m, 200m) and (500m, 500m), and 5 DUEs are randomly located in the square area of 300m * 300m, which is shown in Fig. 4 . The BS, CUE and FAE are denoted as pattern circle, diamond and square, respectively. D2D transmitters are denoted as pattern triangles and the paired D2D receivers are located in the circle around them. Without other explanation, all the simulations are performed under the placement above. The large scale fading is considered, the path loss factor is set as n = 3, and the background noise N 0 = 10 −10 W . And the transmission power of all users are divided into 5 levels, where P C = P A = {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1}W , P N = {0.02, 0.04, 0.06, 0.08, 0.1}W . For DUEs, we consider the average tradeoff between the sum achievable secrecy rate, the sum transmission power and interference compensation costs of all DUEs. And we set the transmission power cost c D = c C = c A = 1, interference compensation factor β = 1.
A. CONVERGENCE OF THE PROPOSED ALGORITHMS
Under the BHPCA algorithm with perfect information, the power control evolution processes of CUE, FAE and DUEs in a one-time simulation are shown in Fig. 5 (a) and (b) , the utility evolution processes of them are shown in Fig. 5 (c) . We can see that the power selections and utilities of all users under the BHPCA algorithm with perfect information converge after about 20 iterations.
Under the HHPCA algorithm with imperfect information, the power control evolution processes of CUE and a randomly VOLUME 7, 2019 selected DUE (such as the first DUE) are shown in Fig. 6 (a) and (b) , respectively, while the utilities evolution processes of all users are shown in Fig. 6 (c) . The power selections and utilities converge about 300 iterations under the HHPCA algorithm. It is found that the more information legitimate users master, the more quickly they can converge to the optimal power selection strategies.
B. COMPARISON OF AVERAGE PERFORMANCE UNDER DIFFERENT ALGORITHMS
In this subsection, we compare the average utilities of different users under different algorithms. To verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms, we compare them with random selection algorithm (RSA), under which every user randomly select its strategy. For evaluating the average performance of users, 10,000 independent trials are performed.
Firstly, we compare the average utilities of different users with the self-interference factor of the FAE under different algorithms in Fig. 7-9 . We can see that the average sum utility of DUEs increases with the self-interference factor of FAE in Fig. 7 , while the utility of FAE decreases in Fig. 9 under all algorithms. That is because when the self-interference gets more and more critical, the wiretapping and jamming performance of FAE will reduce. Whereas DUEs can improve their achievable secrecy rates in opposite directions. It is easy to find that the average utility of CUE maintains almost unchanged with the variation of the self-interference of FAE in Fig. 8 . The reason is that self-interference of FAE only affects the wiretapping rate for DUEs, but nearly has no effects on the transmission rate of CUE.
Moreover, we also find the sum average utility of DUEs under BHPCA algorithm is larger than the one under HHPCA and RSA algorithms. Since under BHPCA algorithm, DUEs can obtain the perfect information of FAE and CUE, and they can make the best response after the latter two players making their power decisions. Under HHPCA algorithm, DUEs and CUE can improve their anti-eavesdropping and anti-jamming performance through different learning methods with the imperfect information of FAE. Therefore, the proposed two algorithms both outperform the RSA algorithm. However, the average utility of FAE has totally opposite phenomena. It is easy to explain that when legitimate users have no knowledge of the rival environment, the FAE gains the best benefit. If legitimate users can learn from the dynamic environment, the utility of FAE will decrease. And if legitimate users possess fully information of environment, the FAE has the weakest destruction for legitimate users. Secondly, we investigate average utilities of different users versus the number of DUEs in Fig. 10-12 . We fix the selfinterference factor of FAE α = 10 −10 for this part of simulations. It can be seen that average sum utility of DUEs first increases and then decreases with the increasing of the number of DUEs. On the contrary, the average utility of FAE decreases firstly and increases with the increasing of number of DUEs thereafter. That is because when the number of DUEs increases, they can achieve more gains at the beginning. Then as the number of DUEs increasing continuously, the inner interference gets greater and greater, and finally becomes the constraint on performance improvement of all DUEs. For the CUE, the average utility decreases as the number of DUEs increasing. That's because the more DUEs access the cellular networks, the more interference they introduce to CUE, and the increment of interference compensation can't overtake the reducing of the SINR of CUE under this simulation setup.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed the joint and cooperative power control problem of CUE and DUEs with a FAE to improve the anti-eavesdropping and anti-jamming performance of the D2D underlaying cellular networks. In the proposed hierarchical power control game, DUEs, CUE and FAE worked as leaders, vice leader and follower to optimize their utilities in sequential. Moreover, the hierarchical power strategies were proved to have at least one SE. Based on the two proposed hierarchical and heterogeneous learning algorithms, legitimate users made their optimal power strategies and SE was finally achieved under perfect and imperfect information. Numerical results verified the convergence of the proposed two algorithms which also outperformed RSA algorithm. In the near future, we will further quantify the imperfect observation of information, such as, using observation accuracy factor to analyze the effect of limited information for strategy optimization and learning of legitimate users.
